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Abstract—Reporting granular energy usage data from smart
meters to power grid enables effective power distribution by
smart grid. Demand Response (DR) mechanism incentivize users
towards efficient use of energy. However, consumer’s energy
consumption pattern can reveal personal and sensitive information regarding their lifestyle. Therefore, to ensure users privacy,
differentially distributed noise is added to the original data.
This technique comes with a trade off between privacy of the
consumer versus utility of the data in terms of providing services
like billing, Demand Response schemes, and Load Monitoring.
In this paper, we propose a technique - Differential Privacy
with Noise Cancellation Technique (DPNCT) - to maximize
utility in aggregated load monitoring and fair billing while
preserving users’ privacy by using noise cancellation mechanism
on differentially private data. We introduce noise to the sensitive
data stream before it leaves smart meters in order to guarantee
privacy at individual level. Further, we evaluate the effects
of different periodic noise cancelling schemes on privacy and
utility i.e., billing and load monitoring. Our proposed scheme
outperforms the existing scheme in terms of preserving the
privacy while accurately calculating the bill.
Index Terms—Differential Privacy (DP), Smart Grid (SG),
Demand Side Management (DSM), Privacy Preservation.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The term Cyber Physical System (CPS) refers to large scale
intelligent, reactive and highly configurable hybrid system
which has both physical and computational properties. In smart
grids, CPS is enabled through smart meters, which are entities
that collect end user consumption data at high frequency in
real time, transmitting this data to the utility grid provider.
Such real time collection of end-user data facilitates Demand
Response (DR) schemes which influence the customer demand
of energy usage from peak time to off peak time for better
distribution and generation of load. The issue is that such
DR schemes and detailed collection of energy usage data can
reveal sensitive and private information regarding consumer’s
life style [1].
Molina-Markham et al. [2] shows that the power consumption pattern can reveal personal information including, but
not limited to, the time periods when the consumer is not
at home, the type of electrical devices that are being used at
a household, and any change in the habits of the consumer
such as sleeping and eating. This information can be used for
targeted marketing and can pose a serious security threat to
the consumer.

In order to address the challenge of privacy invasion,
Differential Privacy (DP) first proposed by Dwork et al. [3],
is a mechanism that adds noise to the critical data in a
way that addition, deletion or change in an individual record
makes insignificant difference to the overall output. A central
architectural component of DP is an aggregator which acts as
an intermediary between smart meter and power grid, which
collects the smart meter data at a network level and provides
services, including but not limited to bill calculation of individuals, load monitoring, and enforcement of DR schemes.
The goal of using DP for smart meter data is to release
the statistics to the aggregator for critical decision making in
DR schemes while preserving user’s privacy. The challenge
associated with this goal is how to provide a mechanism that
preserves individual user privacy, enabling the aggregator to
calculate total energy consumption of all smart meters in an
area at an instant in time t and individual users over a period
of time T .
In the past, different proposals by Eibl et al [5] and Won et
al [8] focus on providing privacy on aggregated data where differentialy perturbed noise is added at trusted aggregator level,
protecting user’s privacy in the aggregated data. For example,
if adversary knows the aggregated data, it can not deduce
sensitive information from it. The problem with this approach,
is that privatizing aggregated data does not guarantee complete
privacy of individuals as unprotected non private aggregated
smart meter data can still reveal some critical information
about the users [9]. To address this challenge Hassan et
al. [6] introduced the Differentially Private Dynamic Pricing
for Demand Response (DRDP) scheme, providing individual
level privacy. In this scheme the smart meters send original
data to the trusted aggregator which masks the data using
distributed noise and reports the data to the utility grid along
with the billing information. The trusted aggregator stores and
calculates the bill according to the original data. The challenge
with DRDP, is that it assumes the aggregator as a trusted entity,
which introduces significant security risks.
Given the above context in this paper we propose a Differential Privacy with Noise Cancellation Technique (DPNCT)
scheme, that assumes the aggregator entity is untrusted which
may attempt to invade the privacy of users. In this paper, we
will demonstrate how DPNCT achieves accuracy in billing
and load monitoring ensuring users’ privacy without the use
of a trusted third party aggregator. As part of our analysis we

TABLE I: Comparison of Techniques for Privacy Preserving using Differential Privacy in smart meters
Ref. No
[4]

[5]

Focus
Differential
Privacy
without trusting third
party
Infinite Divisibility of
Laplacian Noise with
post processing smoothing
Pricing

Privacy
Type
Differential
Privacy with
Encryption
Differential
Privacy

[6]

Dynamic
Privacy

and

Differential
Privacy

[7]

Privacy for Appliance
Usage

Differential
Privacy

[8]

Fault Tolerance

[9]

Analysis of Accuracy vs
Privacy

Differential
Privacy with
Encryption
(Modular
addition)
Differential
Privacy

[10]

Privacy with State Estimation

Differential
Privacy

Working Mechanism

Limitation

Multiple exchange of encrypted messages with aggregator
for differentially private data

Partial fault tolerance, Increased utilization of bandwidth, Privacy for
aggregated data only

Adding gamma distributed noise to each individual agent
using infinite divisible laplace distribution

Dual Differential Privacy with Dynamic pricing using
trusted third party
Differential privacy using Laplacian noise with filtering
attack analysis to preserve appliance usage privacy

Differential privacy using Laplacian noise with current
and future cipher text for fault tolerance with modular
additive encryption
Finding balance at individual level privacy with increased
data points for decrease in billing error
Analysis of State estimation vs individual Privacy using
differential privacy

have benchmarked DPNCT against DRDP [6] with different
noise cancellation schemes (hourly, daily, and weekly) on total
power consumption at an instant t for load monitoring and total
consumption of an individual over a period of time T .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discuss the related work and how our solution differs from
them. In section III, we present our proposed solution along
with algorithm and example. In section IV, we discuss the
performance analysis of our scheme and finally conclude the
discussion in section V.
II. L ITERATURE R EVIEW
Table I, gives an overview of the comparison of different
privacy solutions for smart grid using DP. [5], [8] provides
privacy for the aggregated data only using infinite divisibility of Laplacian distribution. As previously mentioned the
challenge with these approaches is that protected aggregated
data still can leak useful information regarding individuals.
In order to address this issue, Acs et al [4] use cryptography
schemes, which relies on users sharing cryptographic keys or
ciphertexts with each other, which is difficult to manage as
the systems scales. Won et al. [8] builds upon the solution
provided by [4] to address the scalability issue and provides
fault tolerance by introducing modular additive encryption. Using this approach, smart meters send private data with current
and future ciphertexts to cater for future transmission failure,
helping system to run smoothly even in scenarios when smart
meter fails to share its ciphertext. The challenge with the
solutions outlined above is that even though they provide DP,
their implementation makes them computationally complex
and expensive. The most relevant work in smart grid privacy
using purely differential privacy is [6], [7], [9] where they used
Laplacian distribution for generation of noise for individual

Privacy for Aggregated information
only
Too much trust on third party for
storing real data and calculation of
bills, No analysis on the usability of
differentially private data at grid level
Reduced accuracy in utility

Computationally Complex, No privacy for individuals

Reduced accuracy in utility
Lack of analysis on the impact of
differential noise on billing

level privacy. Barbosa et al. [7] used filtering time series attack
to validate appliance usage privacy of individual consumers.
Trajectory level privacy technique is used by Hale et al. [9]
which protects sensitive smart meter data over a period of
time at an individual level and analyze the cost of privacy
over accuracy in billing and aggregated load monitoring. By
not using a trusted third party [7], [9], introduce a certain
level of inaccuracy in bills for the users as a cost of privacy.
The authors from [6] provide usage based dynamic billing
along with differential privacy at aggregator level. The noise is
generated at the aggregator level and then added to individual
data points before sending it to the grid utility. For dynamic
billing, the aggregated load is compared with peak allowed
load and only the individuals who are responsible for peak load
are charge. However, they depend on a trusted third party and
assume a “curious but honest” aggregator to provide privacy. In
contrast, in our approach we do not make this assumption, and
instead we provide individual level privacy at the smart meter
level, before it reaches the aggregator component. In addition,
our solution also includes a noise cancellation technique to
deal with the error in dynamic billing and load monitoring.
III. P ROPOSED S OLUTION : DPNCT
In this section we present our novel solution along with preliminary information of DP as privacy preserving technique.
A. System Model
Our model illustrated in Figure 1, shows three main physical
entities: smart meters, aggregators, and utility grid. To calculate total energy consumption in an area at an instant t, the
aggregator receives differentialy private energy consumption
data of each user transmitted by smart meters. However, this
data alone does not provide accurate information of total load

Fig. 1: System Model: All smart meters send DPNCT masked data to aggregator and group master sends aggregated noise of
the group to the aggregator which is subtracted from total masked data to get true aggregated load.
TABLE II: Key Notations and their Description used in
Algorithm 1 and 2
Key
mIDs
N
xt

Description
IDs of all master smart
meters
Total number of smart
meters
Original load consumption of the household at
time t

Key
ErT −1
NK
∆t

Description
Error in previous bill reported by smart meters
Aggregated group noise
chosen
scheme
in
DPNCT (Hourly, Daily,
Monthly)

at an instant t due to the addition of noise in the data at smart
meter level. To deal with this issue, smart meters send their
added noise at time t to a randomly selected master smart
meter shown as blue house in the Figure 1. The master smart
meter then accumulates this noise from all member smart
meters in the group and sends it to the aggregator where
this accumulated noise gets subtracted from aggregated private
data. This process gives an accurate information of total energy
consumption at an instant t for load monitoring. To calculate
total energy consumption of an individual we propose a noise
cancelling DP mechanism (DPNCT), where in addition to
adding Laplacian noise n∆t in time period ∆t, each user
subtracts the noise nc added in ∆t − 1. As a demand response
scheme, aggregator checks if the total energy consumption of
a single user is more then maximumAllowedU nits set by
grid utility, then instead of base unit price, aggregator charges
surcharge price for the extra units. However, if the user gets
surcharged price due to added noise then the error is corrected
in the next bill.
B. Differential Privacy
As proposed by Dwork et al. [3] differential private noise
gives  privacy for a mechanism, M , if for any two neighbouring data-sets D1 and D2 which differ in at most one record

Algorithm 1: Calculation of Bill and Aggregated Load
at Aggregator
Function AggregatedLoadCalculation();
begin
Input: mIDs
while Billing Period T do
for all smart meters i in N do
Xi = getMaskedData(i);
end
for masterID in mIDs do
NK = getNoiseData(masterID);
end
P
PK
totalLoadt = N
i=1 Xi −
i=1 Ni ;
end
end
Function BillCalculation();
begin
Input:
maxU nits, SurchargeP rice, U nitP rice,ErT −1
for all smart meters i in N do
P
if Ti Xi ≥ maxAllaowedU nits then
surchargeU
nits =
P
Xi − maxAllaowedU nits;
BaseBill = maxAllaowedU nits ∗ U nitP rice;
SurchargeBill =
surchargeU nits ∗ SurchargeP rice;
T otalBilli
=BaseBill + SurchargeBill − ErT −1 ;
Notify T otalBilli and surchargeU nits to
smart meter i;
else
P
T otalBilli =
Xi ∗ U nitP rice;
Notify T otalBilli to smart meter i ;
end
end
end

TABLE III: Comparison of DPNCT with DRDP
Feature
Aggregator-to-grid anonymity
Dynamic Billing
User-to-Aggregator anonymity

DRDP [6]
Yes
Yes
No

DPNCT
Yes
Yes
Yes

Algorithm 2: Differential Privacy With Noise Cancellation at Smart Meter
Function DPNCT();
begin
Input: xt , ID, ∆t, masterIDt , totalBill, surchargeU nits
Nt−1 = Nt ;
Nt = 0;
while Time Period ∆t do
nt = G(N,λ) - G’(N,λ);
Nt = Push(nt );
nct−1 = Pop(Nt−1 );
Xt = xt + nt - nct−1 ;
Send Xt to aggregator ;
if masterIDt = ID then
for all k smart meters in group do
get noise nk,t from member smart meter;
end
P
Report aggregated group noise k nk,t to
aggregator
else
Send nt to master smart meter with masterIDt
end
end
if surcharge Reported By Aggrgator then
if SurchargeU nits ≥ T otalN oisein∆t then
Error = T otalN oise
else
Error = SurchargeU nits ;
end
Notify Error To Aggregator ;
else
Error = 0;
end
end

by any smart meter at all time. Selection and analysis of
different sensitivity strategies is out of scope of this paper’s
work.
2) Infinite divisibility of Laplace distribution: For the privacy of individual consumer we need to add noise at each
smart meter before reporting the data to the aggregator. We
use Laplacian noise due to its property of infinite divisibility
as each smart meter will add noise on their own independently
without any prior knowledge of other smart meters. Infinite
divisibility of Laplace distribution states that if a random
variable is sampled from the probability distribution function
of Laplace distribution that is: f (x, λ) = 1/2(e|x|/λ ), then the
distribution is infinitely distributed for N ≥ 1,
Lap(λ) =

N
X

(G(N, λ) − G0 (N, λ))

Where G and G0 are independent and identical distributed
gamma density functions with same parameters. N is the
number of smart meters at network level and λ is drawn on the
basis of  and point wise sensitivity. Equation 3 implies that
at an instant t the aggregated noise of all smart meters would
be equal to Lap(λ) when using gamma density function.
C. Differentially Private Noise Cancellation Mechanism
We assume that our smart grid model has N smart meters
and one aggregator. Each smart meter i records its power consumption reading xi,t in kW h at an instant t. Since, aggregator
does not need to know the individual consumption of users,
each smart meter i adds gamma noise to its original energy
consumption data at time t i.e. xi,t + (G(N, λ) − G0 (N, λ))
and sends this masked data to the aggregator. Using 3, the
masked data Xi,t of N smart meters gives differential privacy
of  when aggregated as follows.
N
X

xi,t +(G(N, λ)−G0 (N, λ)) =

i=1

and for all possible answers S ⊆ Range(M ), the following
equation holds true.
P r(M (D1) ∈ S) ≤ e ∗ P r(M (D2) ∈ S)

(1)

In simpler terms, it is unlikely that an adversary finds out
anything meaningful from smart meters data-set that is differentially private where  is the privacy parameter controlled by
user ranges from 0 to 1. The lesser the value of  the more
private the data would be but, with less utility.
1) Sensitivity: Sensitivity of a function f is defined as maximum difference in output of any two neighbouring datasets. In
our case, we can make use of pointwise sensitivity, explained
in detail by Eibl and Engel [5], where each data smart meter
i at time t generates noise ni,t independently irrespective of
the data of other smart meters.
Spw = maxD1,D2 |f (D1) − f (D2)| = maxi,t |xi,t |
(2)
P
So the query at time t is t = /t private such that
t = 
where sensitivity for the data would be maximum consumption

(3)

i=1

N
X

xi,t +Lap(λ) =

i=1

N
X

Xi,t

i=1

(4)
However, to increase the accuracy of aggregated load at an
instant t, we use aggregated noise cancellation protocol. In this
protocol, each smart meter is assigned an ID by aggregator
and in each round K groups are formed. Each group has k out
of N smart meters randomly selected. A master ki is selected
randomly in each group and all members send their noise to
the master which then send the aggregated group noise to the
aggregator.
Pk The aggregator subtract the aggregated group noise
i.e., i=1 ni,t from total masked values (Xi,t ) to get accurate
load at time t as follows.
n
X
i=1

Xi,t −

k
X
i=1

ni,t =

n
X

xi,t

(5)

i=1

In order to improve accuracy in billing, each smart meter
records noise added to the smart meter data over a period
of time ∆t. Each smart meter generate gamma noise ni,t
independently using 3 and adds it to the original data before
reporting to the aggregator. The total noise added in ∆t is

Comparision of DRDP and DPNCT on Daily Profile
Real-Time Data
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Protected DPNCT
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Fig. 2: Evaluation of differential privacy and comparison of DRDP and DPNCT with real-time daily profile of a randomly
selected house. Fig. 2(a) shows comparison of DRDP and DPNCT with real-time data. This graph shows that the daily usage is
well masked by both DRDP and DPNCT schemes. But with DPNCT, the masking is much better. Fig. 2(b) shows comparison
of MAE between Original Unprotected data, DRDP, and DPNCT in total energy consumption.

subtracted from the smart meter data in the next period of
time ∆t to cancel the overall effect of noise in billing. We
will see the effect of selecting this time period ∆t schemes
in performance evaluation section. The protocol is further
elaborated in Algorithm 2 with the help of Table II.
IV. P ERFORMANCE A NALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate our algorithm for privacy and
accuracy. The experiments are performed over the energy
consumption data provided by [11] and results are compared
with the benchmark set by DRDP [6]. In [11] residential
energy profiles in watts of 200 households with the granularity
of 10 minutes is provided which gives T = 6∗24∗30 = 4, 320
data points per month for a single household. For implementation of DPNCT we used Numpy library of Python 3.0 (cf.
https://numpy.org). For simplicity, we used  = 1 and pointwise sensitivity maxi,t |xi,t | with mean = 0 to calculate scale
parameter λ for Laplacian noise generation. The complexity
cost of generating a random number is O(1) and our algorithm
adds a random number i.e., noise nt at each reading xi,t so
the complexity of our Algorithm per smart meter is O(N ),
N being the total number of data points in time period T .
For noise cancellation, we keep track of the noise added in
previous period ∆tt−1 and the same noise is then subtracted
in the next period ∆tt . We compare noise cancelling schemes
with ∆t as hourly, daily, and weekly. For dynamic billing
we set M axAllowedU nits to be 5500kW h and U nit and
SurchargeP rice to be 10$ and 20$ respectively. All the
experiments were performed 20 times and the average of them

is taken as to normalise the nature of randomness in the noise
cancellation and noise generation.
In the Figure 2, we compare our DPNC Technique with the
results of DRDP strategy used by [6] on the daily profile of a
randomly chosen single user. In the given Figure 2a, the solid
black line denotes original real-time data and the dotted blue
line shows protected data by DRDP, the dotted red line depicts
DPNCT protected data. The masking effect of noise added by
DPNCT technique has close to none correlation (0.11, 1 being
the highest correlation) with the real-time data profile. This
low correlation depicted in 2a, means that an adversary cannot
infer a users behaviour and life style patterns, ensuring the
privacy of user data patterns generated without the underlying
assumption of a trusted third party aggregator.
As demonstrated in the Table III, our proposed DPNCT,
ensures user-to-aggregator anonymity as an additional feature
over DRDP. We calculated Mean Absolute Error (MAE) in
total energy consumption of a single household as follows:
M AE =

N
X
|xi − Xi |
i=1

xi

(6)

Where |xi − Xi | is the absolute error between sum of real
values and total DPNC masked values of a household. In
Figure 2b, we compare MAE in total energy consumption
of a single household between DPNCT hourly scheme and
DRDP. The impact of DPNCT schemes on the utility goals of
smart metering data i.e., billing and load aggregation for load
monitoring and dynamic pricing, is analysed in the following
subsections.

instant t would be Lap(λ). This means the worst case scenario
can be improved by selecting robust value for sensitivity
instead of overall maximum. Different statistical techniques
are used by [8], [9] to increase the utility of aggregated load,
which is one of our future goals.
V. C ONCLUSION

Fig. 3: Comparison of Mean Absolute Error in different
schemes of DPNCT for total consumption and dynamic bill
of a randomly selected household.

1) Billing: For billing period T , if a single meter i with
energy consumption xi,t provides the i differential privacy
at an instant t then the total error in the bill would be noise
Lap(λ)∆t added in the last ∆t of the billing period T , where
∆t can be an hour or a day or a week, according to the
selected noise cancellation technique. In Figure 3, we compare
different noise cancellation period schemes i.e., hourly, daily,
and weekly. We calculated Mean Absolute Error (MAE) in
total energy consumption (kW h) of a arbitrarily selected
single household. In Figure 3, we also compared the effect of
different schemes on our dynamic billing scheme. The MAE in
hourly noise cancellation scheme for total energy consumption
was the lowest (0.045) because of the least amount of noise
left at the end of the billing period. For example, in hourly
noise cancelling scheme, if a total noise nt1 of 7kW h is added
in the hour 12 : 00 − 01 : 00 then the cancelling noise of
exact same amount i.e., 7kW h is subtracted in the next hour
01 : 00 − 02 : 00. The MAE at the end of billing period
for hourly noise cancellation scheme was the lowest (0.06)
because the bill only has small error added due to the addition
of noise in the last hour of last day of the billing period.
The MAE in total energy consumption of daily and weekly
schemes are 0.2 and 0.5 respectively. As the error in bill is
reported to the aggregator and it gets corrected in the next
billing period, the customer sees no impact in terms of billing
given the operation of the DPNCT Algorithm 1.
2) Load Monitoring: For Load Monitoring at an instant t,
each xi,t provides
the t at instant t then the total privacy
P
would be
t . In best case scenario, the average error in
aggregated load would be zero due to aggregated noise cancellation as all the k groups send aggregated noise at an instant t.
However, in worst case scenario where no accumulated noise
would be reported by any group then the total noise at an

In this paper, we proposed a privacy preserving solution
for smart meters with maximum utility for bill calculation
and aggregated load monitoring using noise cancellation technique. Further, we cancel the effect of noise on the surcharge
billed to the customer due to the added noise. In this way,
minimizing the financial impact of privacy on the costumer
while preserving the privacy. DPNCT provides 5% MAE in
total energy consumption and 6% in billing as compared to
DRDP which provides 100% MAE in total load consumption
and 70% in billing. Similarly, privacy at the individual level
precludes the requirement of a trusted third party and ensures
that adversary will not be able to deduce users’ life style
and sensitive behavioural information from collected data. In
future, we will work on the selection of sensitivity and analysis
of its impact on aggregated load monitoring.
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